Langdell's system, with its singleminded focus on previously decided cases, was too narrow and formalistic, a "mechanical jurisprudence." Pound insisted that lawyers and legal scholars needed to take into account the insights of sociology, economics, and political science to fully understand the role of law, an approach he called "sociological jurisprudence." Sociological jurisprudents, according to Pound, "look to the working of the law rather than to its abstract content; they regard law as a social institution involving both finding by experience and conscious making-an institution which may be improved by conscious human effort."
4 Pound was not himself religious, but he traveled in the same Progressive circles as advocates of the Social Gospel, the liberal Protestant movement that married modern critical theology with an optimistic program for social reform; 5 and Pound, unlike Langdellian legal science and subsequent movements such as Legal Realism, which emerged in the 1930s, included morality as a central concern of the law.
3 For more detail on Langdell's innovations, see Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983) . The transformation of American higher education in the late nineteenth century is chronicled in GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF (1994) . 4 Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence, in THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 444, 458 (H. Barnes, ed. 1925) . 5 Pound's biographer notes, for instance, that he urged his students, while he was teaching at Northwestern after the turn of the century, "to attend the lectures given by Charles R. Henderson, a Social Gospel chaplain who doubled as a criminologist." WIGDOR, supra note 2, at 142.
It is tempting to imagine how things might have been different if a friendship had taken root in that Nebraska courthouse. If Bryan had included people like Pound among his advisors, their friendship might (one can at least dream) have sown the seeds for an early twentieth century Christian legal scholarship.
But it didn't. Bryan, the nation's leading evangelical at the end of the nineteenth century, crafted his appeal for the untutored "common man," keeping a wary distance from secular intellectual elites like Pound. In Bryan's mind, as Richard Hofstadter put it in a highly critical account, "faith and democracy converged in a common anti-intellectualist rationale. On the one side were the voices of the people and the truths of the heart; on the other were the intellectuals, a small arrogant elite given over to false science and mechanical rationalism." 8 Pound returned the favor. Pound disdained the Populist movement that Bryan represented, lacing his later speeches with dismissive references whenever the occasion seemed to call for a laugh line. "He found the raw protest of lower-class reform distasteful," according to his biographer: "it lacked dignity, it was not respectable, and its arguments were unsound." 9 During Bryan's first presidential campaign in 1896, Pound even published a careful, numbers crunching refutation of Bryan's signature issue, the argument for unlimited coinage of silver to inflate the currency and shore up the price of farmers' wheat. J. 493 (1942) . See also Kennedy, Realism, What Next?, 7 FORD. L. REV. 208 (1938) . These attacks were the bubbling over of a neo-Thomist ferment in Catholic law schools and universities that had begun several years earlier. The immediate catalyst for the 1942 articles seems to have been the publication of Holmes' correspondence with Sir Frederick Pollock, which revealed a harsher, more condescending and cynical side of Holmes than was reflected in his public persona. For a helpful discussion of these developments, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159-78 (1973) . Purcell notes the influence of the completion of the third edition of Jurisprudence by Father Francis P. Le Buffe, S.J. in 1938, which forcefully rejected the relativism of much modern philosophical thought. Although Holmes was their principal target, the neo-Thomist challenge was aimed at legal realism generally. Other than Jerome Frank, however, who adopted a more accommodating stance toward natural law, the realists "did not ... give in to their critics on any fundamental point." Id. at 175. See also Rodell, Holmes and His Hecklers, 15 THE PROGRESSIVE 9 (1951) .
accept "the implications of divine authority ... becomes predominant in our philosophy, we shall be obliged once more to free ourselves from the old shackles." 19 In short, unlike evangelical scholarship, Catholic scholarship existed, but it rarely saw the light of day in the top law reviews.
In a survey of the articles of the elite law reviews from 1900 to 2000, I found only a handful prior to 1990 that reflected a discernible Christian perspective. 20 For much of twentieth century, there simply was no real Christian legal scholarship in America's leading law reviews.
By the mid 1970s, evangelicals had fully emerged from their cultural slumber and would soon flex their political muscles on issues like the tax exemption for religious schools, abortion, and gay rights. I fully stand by the assessment of that article. But there also is increasing evidence that a real renaissance may finally be underway. Several very promising articles have appeared in the law reviews in the past year, and more seem to be on their way. The short answer, in my view, is that seeking to do Roscoe Pound's sociological jurisprudence (and its first cousin, Legal Realism) all over again, but with religious perspectives included, would be a worthy mission for the next several decades of Christian legal scholarship. Recall that Pound admonished the scholars of his era to "look to the working of the law rather than
[solely] to its abstract content," and to treat law "as a social institution involving both finding by experience and conscious making." A Christian scholar might qualify these words with a reminder that the backdrop against which our lawmaking takes place is the moral order that God has structured into the universe. But the attention to social, political, and economic context- 5-20 (unpublished manuscript, 2007) (distinguishing between "transcendent" and "participatory" views of knowledge, and arguing for the latter). 34 The history of the Universal Declaration is recounted, and the role of a group of philosophers briefly described,
in MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
Nevertheless, I suspect that many of the most exciting developments in Christian legal scholarship in the next generation of work will come from outside the domain of traditional philosophical analysis. In part, this is simply a matter of numbers and percentages. Of the Christian legal scholars who had emerged by the end of the twentieth century, surely 70 or 80%
can be characterized as focusing on philosophy, the First Amendment religion clauses, or some combination of the two. Other areas have received far less attention. These comparatively underexplored issues and perspectives offer opportunities for exciting new contributions.
It also seems to me that in the hands of us legal scholars, moral philosophy often becomes a debate about abstract propositions, and never quite gets to the street level business of trying to make sense of how the law actually functions and the lessons that can be learned from this. Rather than abstract propositions, the focus of the coming generation of Christian legal scholars will, I think, more often be on the orientation of the law: does it reflect the God who welcomes back the prodigal son, and who became flesh and dwelt among us? In short, for the decade to come, there is something to be said for, if not entirely reversing the percentages I referred to a moment ago, at least shifting them somewhat.
Who?
The second question I would like to consider is, "Who," or "Whose work are we talking about when we talk about Christian legal scholarship?" The particular question here is whether a scholar must be a Christian to write Christian legal scholarship.
I suppose the obvious answer to this question would be yes, one must be a Christian to produce Christian legal scholarship. It says so right in the label. But I don't think this is correct.
Perhaps the answer depends on just what one means by Christian legal scholarship. In my view,
Christian legal scholarship is scholarship that does two things: 1) it provides either a normative theory derived from Christian scripture or tradition; or a descriptive theory that explains some aspect of the influence of Christianity on law, or of law on Christianity; and 2) it seriously engages the best secular scholarship treating the same issues. The great promise of these law schools is their willingness to nurture and reward religiously informed scholarship. Young scholars in secular law schools still face important disincentives to producing faith-oriented scholarship early in their careers, such as the possibility that Christian legal scholarship will be valued less highly in the tenure and promotion process than more traditional secular legal scholarship, and that it may be more difficult to place in elite law journals. If some or many of the scholars in Christian law schools respond by producing scholarship that seriously engages the best secular scholars in their fields, the Christian law schools may foster significant new Christian legal scholarship in the coming years. 45 The two most prominent of the new Catholic law schools are Ave Maria Law School in Michigan (founded 1998) and the University of St. Thomas Law School in Minnesota (re-opened in 1999, sixty-six years after having closed). 46 The practical dilemma faced by a school with a faith-oriented mission statement is that the narrower the mission statement the smaller the pool of scholars who both fit the mission statement and are among the leaders in their particular field. A recent illustration of the tradeoff was the decision by Wheaton College, a premier evangelical college, not to renew the contract of Joshua Hochschild, a promising young philosopher, after he announced his intention to convert to Catholicism. Pepperdine's mission statement reflects a somewhat similar perspective: "The school's Christian emphasis leads to a special concern for imbuing students with the highest principles of professional, ethical, and moral responsibility. An effort is made to call together a faculty, staff, and student body who wish to share this experience of quality legal education in a value-centered context." See http//:law.pepperdine.edu/welcome/mission.html (visited Jan. 9, 2008 
